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When Less Is More: Evolutionary Origins of the Affect
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Jerald D. Kralik*, Eric R. Xu, Emily J. Knight, Sara A. Khan, William J. Levine
Department of Psychological and Brain Sciences, Dartmouth College, Hanover, New Hampshire
Abstract
The human mind is built for approximations. When considering the value of a large aggregate of different items, for
example, we typically do not summate the many individual values. Instead, we appear to form an immediate impression of
the likeability of the option based on the average quality of the full collection, which is easier to evaluate and remember.
While useful in many situations, this affect heuristic can lead to apparently irrational decision-making. For example, studies
have shown that people are willing to pay more for a small set of high-quality goods than for the same set of high-quality
goods with lower-quality items added [e.g. 1]. We explored whether this kind of choice behavior could be seen in other
primates. In two experiments, one in the laboratory and one in the field, using two different sets of food items, we found
that rhesus monkeys preferred a highly-valued food item alone to the identical item paired with a food of positive but lower
value. This finding provides experimental evidence that, under certain conditions, macaque monkeys follow an affect
heuristic that can cause them to prefer less food. Conservation of this affect heuristic could account for similar ‘irrational’
biases in humans, and may reflect a more general complexity reduction strategy in which averages, prototypes, or
stereotypes represent a set or group.
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Introduction
Many real-world problems that humans solve effortlessly appear
intractable when analyzed computationally [2,3,4]. We solve these
‘intractable’ problems through the use of heuristics. Our mind
replaces complicated problems with simpler ones that engender
easy and reasonable approximations [4,5,6,7,8,9,10]. For exam-
ple, the affect heuristic provides an immediate evaluation of stimuli
based on positive or negative valence [11]. Evidence has amassed
for the significance of affect in judgment and decision-making
[4,5,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23], leading Kahneman
[5] to state that, ‘‘The idea of an affect heuristic…is probably the
most important development in the study of…heuristics in the past
few decades. There is compelling evidence for the proposition that
every stimulus evokes an affective evaluation, which is not always
conscious…(pp. 710).’’
An affective evaluation process would be considered a heuristic
if there are cases in which only some stimulus attributes are
evaluated, while others are neglected. A phenomenon that
demonstrates this is the less-is-more effect [11]. For example, when
considering the overall value of a large number of different items,
we normally do not painstakingly summate the individual values.
Instead, we appear to form an immediate impression of the
attractiveness of the option based on the average quality, which is
easier to evaluate and remember [1,4,5,11,17,24,25,26,27]. Thus,
in one study, participants rated a 24-piece dinnerware set more
highly than one with the same twenty-four pieces, plus sixteen
more pieces that included nine broken ones (Hsee, 1998).
Although the latter option offered the same twenty-four pieces
(with an additional seven intact), its attractiveness was reduced by
the additional broken items. A similar less-is-more effect has been
found in many fields of study, under different experimental
conditions, and with various items: e.g., from questions involving
saving lives and earning money, to ratings of clothing, ice cream,
and baseball cards [1,4,5,11,24,26,27,28].
The affect heuristic is limited by how readily stimulus attributes
can be mapped to a point on a one-dimensional valence scale.
That is, the heuristic will normally be applied to attributes that are
readily evaluable as good or bad, such as item quality (are broken
dishes bad?), and will not be applied to attributes that are difficult
to evaluate, such as absolute quantity (exactly how good or bad is
24 of something?) [4,6,7,11,25,26,27,28]. Thus, when evaluating
the dinnerware, quantity is neglected, and the lower quality items
reduce the appeal of the entire set.
There is also evidence that the affect heuristic can be overridden
when the logical choice can be seen clearly, as with direct
comparisons. Thus, people tend to use the heuristic when rating
experiences or options separately but not when they are allowed to
compare them directly. In the latter case, people can see that the
preferred items are contained in the option with the larger number
of items and tend to make the logical choice [26,27,28].
Because many judgment and decision-making heuristics and
biases appear universal and difficult to overcome, they may have
an innate component that is shared with species that face similar
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information processing constraints. Indeed, there is evidence for
shared heuristics and biases between humans and nonhuman
primates, such as loss aversion, framing (in which the way choices
are posed influences preference), and the endowment effect (in
which an item becomes more highly valued once in one’s
possession) [29,30,31]. As yet, however, there is no clear evidence
in nonhuman animals for the affect heuristic, in which certain
attributes are evaluated while others are neglected, as seen in the
less-is-more effect. In one study, macaque monkeys (Macaca
fascicularis, mulatta, and fuscata) and a chimpanzee were given a
choice between a preferred food versus a combination of the same
preferred food and a less preferred one [32]. Rather than finding a
less-is-more effect, the investigators found what they called a
selective-value effect, in which the subjects were indifferent to the
choice alternatives, suggesting that the less-valued item assumed a
null value.
In a follow-up study, however, researchers found that
chimpanzees are highly sensitive to minute differences in the size
of the preferred food, and this sensitivity could explain the chance
performance observed in the previous study [33]. When sizes of
food items were strictly controlled, the chimpanzees preferred the
greater good alone to the combination of the greater and lesser
good. This apparent preference, however, was influenced by the
intertrial interval (ITI). With a short and variable ITI of simply
waiting until the subjects consumed the food, the chimpanzees
appeared to maximize their consumption of the preferred food per
unit time. To do so, they minimized the time spent consuming the
less preferred food. When a constant and relatively long ITI was
added (at least 3 minutes), the chimpanzees selected the food
combination rather than the preferred food alone [33].
In the end, then, the chimpanzees appeared to respond as
humans do when the choice options are compared directly,
exhibiting a more ‘rational’ preference for the food combination.
However, it is possible that there is an evolutionary progression in
the use of the affect heuristic, such that a more distantly-related
species may continue to use the heuristic even when making a
direct comparison between a greater good and a combination of
the greater and a lesser good. Furthermore, because the follow-up
study by Beran, Ratliff, and Evans (2009) was conducted only with
chimpanzees, the results with macaque monkeys remain incon-
clusive.
We conducted the current study to determine whether an Old
World monkey, the rhesus macaque (Macaca mulatta), would show
evidence for an affect heuristic by exhibiting a less-is-more effect
when evaluating food items. Specifically, we asked whether the
monkeys would prefer a highly-valued food item alone over the
identical item paired with a food of positive but lower value. We
reasoned that if the monkeys preferred the highly-valued food item
alone, it would demonstrate the influence of an underlying affect
heuristic. First, choice between food items is a quintessential
example of an affective evaluation, as the decision is based on the
quality and/or quantity of the options [e.g. 13,14,15,16,19,21,34].
Second, if the quantity of the food items were neglected, it would
reveal a limitation in the affective evaluation, given that the food
combination maximizes reward. Such limitations are diagnostic
features of heuristics.
At the same time, it has been argued that any case in which a set
or group is represented via an average, prototype, or stereotype
may be subsumed under the more general representative heuristic,
which may be a general information processing strategy for
complexity reduction used by the brain to cope with an otherwise
intractable world [see 4,9]. Therefore, the demonstration of a less-
is-more phenomenon in which a choice option is represented by
the quality average rather than sum would also provide some
evidence for the shared use of a representative heuristic more
generally between humans and a nonhuman animal. The test of
the less-is-more effect was conducted twice, under controlled




Ethics statement. Experiment 1 complied with all current
laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines of the United States, the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), the Office of
Laboratory Animal Welfare (OLAW), and all procedures were
approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee
(IACUC) of Dartmouth College.
Subjects. Three male rhesus monkeys were tested: Puck,
Hamlet, and Titus, ages 7, 9, and 9 years, respectively. The
monkeys were maintained at approximately 95% of their ad libitum
weights to ensure sufficient motivation and good health, and their
diet consisted of primate chow (no. 5038, PMI Feeds Inc., St
Louis, Missouri, U.S.A.), supplemented with fresh fruit and
vegetables. They were individually housed in a homeroom with
automatically regulated lighting (14:10 hour light:dark cycle, with
lights on at 0600 hours). The facility maintains a full-time animal
care and veterinary staff. The monkeys were brought to the testing
room in custom-made chairs. The chairs were used to (a) minimize
disruption in the test subjects’ daily routines, given that they were
already acclimated to them from a previous response-time
experiment (Knight et al., under review); (b) have precise control
over the experimental testing conditions, including the timing of
the trial sequence; and (c) obtain clear, unbiased choice responses
via button presses, with the buttons at fixed positions relative to the
monkey on every trial.
Materials. In the test room, the monkey and experimenter
sat in chairs across the table from each other (distance 76.2 cm/
30 inches). The monkey’s left arm was loosely restrained, while the
right arm was free to make the choice responses. In Condition 1,
the monkey made its selection by reaching for the food item
presented (see Procedure for details). For Conditions 2 and 3, the
monkey made its selections by pressing one of two buttons
(approximately 16 cm apart measured from the centers) on a panel
placed in front of the monkey. We used grapes and vegetables for
food items (see below), which were selected (grapes) or cut (half
vegetables) to be nearly identical in size and shape to the other
same quality items: i.e., all grapes the same, all vegetable pieces the
same [see 33].
Procedure. To determine appropriate food items for the
experiment, we conducted two preliminary conditions before the
main test condition. In Condition 1, we identified vegetables that
each monkey would eat for 30 consecutive trials: for Hamlet and
Titus it was one half of a sugar snap pea; for Puck it was one half of
a green bean. We used these vegetables and sizes for the
remainder of the experiment. The experimenter sat across the
table from the subject and offered it a vegetable for 30 trials, with
an ITI of approximately 10 s, which included the time that the
monkey took to consume the vegetable.
Condition 2 verified a consistent preference for grapes over
vegetables with a two-alternative forced-choice procedure con-
ducted in one 10-trial session. Each trial began when the
experimenter placed her hands approximately 10 cm from the
back edge of the button panel (from the monkey’s point of view)
and opened her hands to reveal the alternatives. A grape was in
one hand and a vegetable in the other. The position (left or right)
of the alternatives was assigned pseudorandomly, with the
Evolutionary Origins of the Affect Heuristic
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constraint that the locations did not remain the same for more
than three consecutive trials. The experimenter’s hands remained
in this position until the monkey had looked at the alternatives for
approximately 3 s. The experimenter then moved her hands in a
straight line toward the monkey, until each food was located
directly behind a button. The monkey then made a selection by
pressing the button in front of the desired option. The
experimenter moved the selected hand toward the monkey while
simultaneously closing the other hand, enabling the monkey to
retrieve the selected food item. All trials were set up out of view of
the monkey, behind an opaque barrier. The ITI was based on
consumption time, in that each trial began after the monkey
finished consuming the chosen food item. The ITI averages for
each monkey were calculated from videotape coding. The average
ITI was approximately 22 s for Puck, 10 s for Titus, and 15 s for
Hamlet. All three monkeys chose the grape over the vegetable on
all ten trials, verifying the strong preference for the grape over the
vegetable.
In the main experimental condition, Condition 3, we tested the
monkeys on three 30-trial sessions, conducted on separate days.
We used the same procedure as in Condition 2, except that we
now placed a grape in one hand and both a grape and the
vegetable in the other (Figure 1A). Importantly, we made sure the
monkeys obtained both food items when the food combination
was selected. That is, if the monkeys appeared to neglect the less-
preferred item, the experimenter held the food item in front of the
monkey until it was taken. All Condition 3 sessions were
videotaped. The ITI was again based on consumption time, with
each trial beginning after consumption of the previous trial’s
chosen food items. After selecting the single grape alone, the
average ITI was 21.9 s for Puck, 28.7 s for Titus, and 13.5 s for
Hamlet. After selecting grape plus vegetable, the average ITI was
35.4 s for Puck, 49.3 s for Titus, and 21.1 s for Hamlet.
Finally, in Condition 4, to verify that the value of the vegetable
by itself remained positive in subjective value, we conducted a final
30-trial test session, in which the experimenter offered the
vegetable alone and gave it to the monkey after he touched the
corresponding button on the panel. The ITI for this condition was
approximately 10 s for all monkeys. Condition 4 was also observed
by a second experimenter via a closed-circuit video camera and
monitor and videotaped.
To minimize the possible cuing of the subjects by the
experimenter, several procedures were implemented, including
(a) playing white noise in the test room throughout the session to
mask potential auditory cues and distractions; (b) having the
experimenter wear a white lab coat, safety glasses, surgical mask
and gloves to mask potential visual cues; (c) having the
experimenter trained to perform a precise, stereotyped testing
procedure; (d) having the experimenter look downward at the
center of the testing apparatus and observe the monkey’s choices
via peripheral vision to avoid providing gaze cues; (e) having a
separate individual observe the sessions via closed-circuit camera
and monitors; (f) having a separate individual score the results for
the main Condition 3 from the video, with perfect correspondence
among the experimenter, observers and scorer.
Results
As stated previously, the fact that all three monkeys accepted
and ate the offered vegetable for all 30 trials in Condition 1 shows
that the vegetable itself was positive in value. That all of the
monkeys selected the grape over the vegetable in all ten trials of
Condition 2 verifies that there was a strong preference for the
grape. The critical test, then, was Condition 3, in which the
monkeys chose between a single grape and a grape plus vegetable
option. When averaged over the entire session, the results were
mixed. Puck preferred the single grape to the grape plus vegetable
in all three test sessions (83%, 93%, 77%; two-tailed Binomial
tests: P = 0.0003, P,0.0001, P = 0.0052, respectively); for Titus,
although he selected the grape alone more than the grape plus
vegetable in every session, there was no significant overall
preference in any session (for grape alone: 57%, 67%, 67%);
and Hamlet preferred the grape alone in the first two sessions, but
not in the third (77%, 80%, 33%; two-tailed Binomial tests:
P = 0.0052, P = 0.0014, P = N.S., respectively).
However, in all three sessions, we noted that Titus appeared to
satiate on the grape after approximately 20 trials, i.e. at the two-
thirds point of the session, and switched his preference from the
grape alone to the grape-vegetable combination. Thus, for
example, in the first test session, and examining five-trial blocks,
Titus’ performance was 80% for grape alone on the fourth block
and then 0% for grape alone on the fifth block. Across the three
sessions, he averaged 82% for the single grape alone in the first 20
trials; and 27% in the final 10 trials. In addition, when he chose
the combination, the consumption order generally reversed. In all
three sessions combined, the percentage of trials in which the
grape was eaten first in the first 20 trials was 100% (11 out of 11),
whereas in the last 10 trials it was 36% (8 out of 22). He also took
longer to eat the grape in the last 10 trials of every session (average
consumption time for the combination in the first 20 and last 10
trials: 34.2 vs. 56.3 s) or discarded it altogether (last three trials of
Session 2, last two trials of Session 3).
Therefore, to examine preference before selective satiation, we
analyzed the first 20 trials of each session for each monkey. As can
be seen in Figure 1B, all of the monkeys preferred the grape alone
to the grape plus vegetable in the first 20 trials of sessions one and
two (two-tail Binomial tests, Session 1: Puck, 85%, P = 0.0026;
Titus, 75%, P = 0.0414; Hamlet, 80%, P = 0.0118; Session 2:
Puck, 95%, P,0.0001; Titus, 90%, P = 0.0004; Hamlet, 85%,
P = 0.0026). In addition, two of the three monkeys maintained this
preference in the first 20 trials of Session 3 (two-tail Binomial tests:
Puck, 75%, P = 0.0414; Titus, 80%, P = 0.0118), while one
monkey, Hamlet, exhibited no preference by Session 3.
With respect to actual consumption in Condition 3, the grape
was always eaten by all monkeys (on both single grape and
combination selections) except for the five aforementioned trials
for Titus. When the combination was selected, all monkeys took
the vegetable every trial and usually ate it: Puck ate the vegetable 8
out of 14 trials; Titus, 30 out of 33; Hamlet, 29 out of 33.
Regarding consumption order, for Puck and Hamlet (Titus
described above) the grape was eaten first on all trials, with a
single exception during Puck’s Session 1.
Finally, in Condition 4, all three of the monkeys accepted the
vegetable and ate it on all 30 trials (two-tail Binomial test on each
session: 100%, P,0.0001).
Discussion
As seen in Figure 1B, all three monkeys initially preferred the
grape alone to the grape-vegetable combination. Thus, at least
initially, the overall subjective value for the grape alone was higher
than that for the grape and vegetable combination. This effect
persisted for two of the three monkeys (Puck and Titus),
throughout all three test sessions for Puck, and throughout the
first two-thirds of every test session for Titus. The third monkey,
Hamlet, initially exhibited a strong preference for the grape alone,
but this preference dissipated in the third session. This change in
choice behavior is intriguing and suggests that, under certain
conditions, rhesus macaques can learn to overcome an initial
suboptimal preference.
Evolutionary Origins of the Affect Heuristic
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The preference for the grape alone cannot be explained by a
distaste for the vegetable, given that vegetable was selected for the
experiment because the monkeys accepted and ate it on all trials in
Condition 1; and the vegetable was again accepted and eaten by
all monkeys on all Condition 4 trials. Although it is possible that
the preference for the grape alone might be explained by a
potential taste-taste interaction between the grape and vegetable,
such that, in combination, they are distasteful, we find this
unlikely. First, we purposely chose fruits and vegetables to
minimize a possible taste interaction effect. Second, rhesus
Figure 1. Experiment 1 illustration and results. A. Illustration of the main test condition. The monkey pressed the corresponding red or blue
button to make a choice. B. Results for the first 20 trials of each session for each monkey. Data were analyzed using two-tailed Binomial tests:
* P,0.05; ** P,0.01; *** P,0.001; **** P,0.0001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046240.g001
Evolutionary Origins of the Affect Heuristic
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monkeys are omnivores and have a wide-ranging palette that
includes numerous fruits and vegetables [e.g. 35]. Third, the
monkeys in our experiment were food-restricted to maintain a
constant level of motivation and good health, and, thus, they
should have been motivated to maximize reward. Fourth, when
the combination was selected, both were usually eaten. Thus, we
think it is unlikely that the reduction in the subjective value of the
combination was due to a taste-taste interaction between the food
items. Nonetheless, one of the objectives of Experiment 2 was to
test the generality of the less-is-more finding using a new pair of
food items.
As stated, when the combination was selected, both were
typically eaten. In these cases, even though the vegetable reduced
the overall combined value, the vegetable itself nonetheless
maintained a positive value in the presence of the grape (and vice
versa for the grape). The results thus provide evidence that the
combined effect of the grape and vegetable values resulted in an
effective averaging rather than a summation of their individual
values. Thus, an averaging heuristic appeared to be applied during
valuation in affective decision-making. In contrast, the instances
when the monkeys did not eat the vegetable provide evidence for
other possible phenomena. For example, the behavior suggests
that there are circumstances in which less-preferred food items
acquire a null (i.e. selective value effect) [32] or negative value in
the presence of the higher-valued item.
The Beran et al. (2009) study suggested that a selective value
effect, whereby individuals appear to ignore the less-preferred food
item, may have been due to differences in the sizes of the more-
preferred food item in the choice options. After using similarly-
sized grapes in our study, we also obtained an interaction between
the two food items, although rather than the lesser good being
ignored, it reduced the overall appeal of the option. In fact, our
finding is similar to that obtained with chimpanzees when short
and variable ITIs were in place [33]. In this situation, the
chimpanzees preferred the single more-preferred piece of banana
to a combination of the same banana piece with a less-preferred
piece of apple. This preference reversed, however, when a longer
ITI was used (at least 3 minutes). When the longer ITI was in
place, the chimpanzees chose the food combination over the
banana piece alone, thus selecting the ‘optimal’ option with the
most food [33]. Thus, it is possible that our results were influenced
by the ITI length, and that the same reversal may occur with
rhesus macaques with a longer ITI. That all three of the monkeys
exhibited a preference for the greater good alone from the onset
and that there was no trend over trials toward a greater preference
for the single item alone serves as evidence against an ITI effect.
Nonetheless, another objective of Experiment 2 was to determine
whether the monkeys’ preference for the single highly-preferred
item was influenced by the repeated trials structure of Experiment
1 that did have an ITI that enabled the monkeys to select and
consume the preferred item without any significant pauses.
As has been shown in humans, suboptimal choices often occur
with one’s immediate, spontaneous reactions and may dissipate as
individuals become more familiar with the problem, as we found
with Hamlet in Experiment 1. The focus of the current study,
however, was not to study the influence of task demands and
experience on choice behavior, but rather, to determine if rhesus
monkeys spontaneously use an affect heuristic. Thus, in Experi-
ment 2, we sought to test more naı̈ve individuals on only one trial




Ethics statement. Experiment 2 complied with all current
laws and regulations of the United States and Puerto Rico, the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), and all
procedures were approved by the Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committee (IACUC) of the Medical Sciences Campus of the
University of Puerto Rico.
Subjects. Subjects were free-ranging, adult male rhesus
monkeys (Macaca mulatta) living on Cayo Santiago in Puerto Rico.
We tested adult males because (1) it was unclear at the outset how
many trials we would obtain, and we attempted to reduce potential
variability in the data set due to lack of power; and (2) they were
more readily found on the periphery of the social groups, which
minimized the potential influence of other monkeys. The colony
on this island is owned and maintained by a branch of the
Caribbean Primate Research Center of the University of Puerto
Rico, and it has approximately 1000 rhesus monkeys living in
different social groups. The monkeys live in semi-wild conditions
where they are given a daily provision of monkey chow.
Food items. We used cucumber (circular cross sections
approximately 0.5 cm thick) and 1/16 apple slices, which were
cut to be nearly identical in size and shape to the other same
quality items: i.e., all cucumber slices the same, all apple slices the
same.
Testing Procedure. In Condition 1, we conducted a taste
test to determine whether the monkeys would eat cucumber slices
when they were offered alone, and thus verify that the value of the
food item was positive. The experimenter walked around the
island searching for individual monkeys to test. When a lone
individual was spotted, the experimenter approached to a distance
of approximately 1.52–3.05 m (5–10 ft) from the monkey. Next,
the experimenter knelt down and placed a white, rectangular
Styrofoam tray on the ground. The experimenter then reached
into a backpack to obtain a cucumber slice, held it vertically and at
chest level for the monkeys to see, then placed the cucumber in the
middle of the Styrofoam tray, stood up, and took two to three steps
backwards from the tray. This setup procedure took approxi-
mately 10 seconds per trial.
In Condition 2, we conducted a preference test with the apples
and cucumbers. Two experimenters approached an isolated
monkey to a distance of approximately 3.05 m (10 ft). With the
monkey as the reference point, the experimenters positioned
themselves at an angle of approximately 90u: one 45u to the
monkey’s left, the other 45u to the monkey’s right. This angle
allowed the monkey to see both experimenters clearly, while
permitting the monkey to approach only one of the two
alternatives. Once in position, both experimenters simultaneously
knelt on their left knee and placed a white, rectangular Styrofoam
tray flat on the ground in front of them. They then reached into
their backpacks with their left hands to retrieve the cucumber and
apple slices, held up their food option vertically at chest level,
waited for the monkey to look at both food options, then placed
the food on the tray, stood up, and stepped back from the trays.
The entire procedure took approximately 10–15 seconds per trial.
Once the experimenters stepped away from the trays, the monkey
typically went directly toward one option and was allowed to take
the food and eat it.
For Condition 3, the main test condition, we carried out a
nearly identical procedure as in the Condition 2 preference test.
For this condition, the experimenters offered the monkeys a choice
between an apple slice alone or an apple slice plus a cucumber
slice (with apple and cucumber slices identical to those in
Evolutionary Origins of the Affect Heuristic
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Figure 2. Experiment 2 testing procedure and results. A. Depictions of the testing procedure. (1) displaying the choice options to the monkey,
with the experimenter on the left (with backpack) presenting the apple and cucumber slices, and the experimenter on the right (backpack not seen in
this view), presenting the apple slice alone; (2) the monkey making its choice. B. Experimental results for all three test conditions. (1) one cucumber
slice alone; (2) a cucumber slice versus an apple slice; (3) an apple and cucumber slice versus an apple slice alone. Data were analyzed using two-
tailed Binomial tests: * = P,0.05; ** = P,0.01; **** = P,0.0001.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0046240.g002
Evolutionary Origins of the Affect Heuristic
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Conditions 1 and 2). When holding up the apple plus cucumber
option to display to the monkey, the experimenter held both items
simultaneously in the same hand so that the monkey would see
both pieces of food clearly. Figure 2A depicts the testing
procedure.
Conditions 1–3 were conducted in order, with the first two (taste
and preference tests) completed on the same day. The critical test,
Condition 3, was conducted on the following day. Conditions 1
and 2 each consisted of 25 trials; Condition 3 consisted of 50 trials.
We attempted to minimize possible repeated trials of individual
monkeys within conditions, and we utilized the research center’s
coding system (ear notches and chest tattoos) to identify individuals
whenever possible. We also enacted multiple measures to ensure
that the experimenters would not affect the outcome, including (a)
having two experimenters who were unaware of the specific
hypotheses conduct the experiment, (b) with both experimenters
wearing white tee-shirts and khaki pants [36], (c) having the
experimenters practice the testing routine multiple times to
develop a highly consistent, stereotyped and synchronized
procedure, (d) making sure the monkeys looked at both choice
options and returned to a neutral gaze (i.e. straight ahead) before
allowing the monkeys to choose, and (e) not making direct eye
contact with the monkeys.
Results
In Condition 1, in which the experimenter offered a cucumber
slice alone, the monkeys approached the tray and consumed the
cucumber slice on 92% of the trials (23/25; two-tailed Binomial
test, P,0.0001; Fig. 2B), including 96% of the identified
individuals (22/23; two-tailed Binomial test, P,0.0001). This
result shows that the cucumber slice generally had a positive value
when offered alone.
In Condition 2, in which two experimenters offered the
monkeys a choice between one apple slice and one cucumber
slice, the monkeys chose the apple slice in 76% of the trials (19/25;
two-tailed Binomial test, P = 0.0146; Fig. 2B), including 77% of the
identified individuals (17/22; two-tailed Binomial test, P = 0.0169),
demonstrating that, on average, the monkeys preferred the apple
slice to the cucumber.
In the main test, Condition 3, the monkeys were offered either
one apple slice or an identical apple slice with an additional
cucumber slice (Figure 2A). The monkeys chose the apple slice
alone in 72% of the trials (36/50; two-tailed Binomial test,
P = 0.0026; Figure 2B), including 74% of the identified individuals
(31/42; two-tailed Binomial test, P = 0.0029).
Discussion
Compared to Experiment 1, this experiment was conducted in a
more naturalistic setting, with many more individuals, with two
different food items, and with a single trial design that precluded
any possible repeated-trials influence on choice behavior in
Condition 3. Despite these differences, the experiments yielded
the same general result. Again, the monkeys preferred the greater
good alone (apple slice) to the greater and lesser good combination
(apple and cucumber slice).
It is possible that the monkeys viewed the choice options as
risky, and perhaps assumed they would likely obtain only one of
the items, and thus approached the lone apple slice. However, we
do not think this is likely. First, following the same logic, it appears
to us that the two-item option would provide a better opportunity
to obtain at least one of them. Second, other studies using the same
general testing paradigm showed that when choosing between
different quantities of the same food item (e.g. apple slices), the
monkeys chose the larger quantity (after factoring out discounting
due to distance from the monkey) [37]. Nonetheless, we do think
that how the problem is posed could influence how the food items
are evaluated. For example, when choosing in isolation, i.e.
without the experimenters present, it is possible that monkeys
could show more of an indifference to the two options, i.e. a
selective-value effect [32], given that the lower-valued option could
simply be neglected without any cost to the individual. To be sure,
the specific conditions under which different effects may occur
must be further investigated.
Finally, although it is possible that the monkeys preferred the
apple slice alone due to a distaste for the apple-cucumber
combination, we again believe this is unlikely for reasons
enumerated in the Discussion section of Experiment 1, including
the wide-ranging diet of rhesus macaques, which includes fruits
and vegetables [35]. Moreover, because we obtained the same
findings in Experiments 1 and 2 with different food items, it is less
likely to be due to the specific food combinations.
General Discussion
When given a choice between a greater good alone versus the
greater good together with a lesser one, the monkeys in
Experiment 2 preferred the greater good alone, as did all three
monkeys at the onset of Experiment 1, a bias that persisted for two
of the three Experiment 1 monkeys. The preference occurred even
though the higher-quality food was included, in its entirety, in the
greater offering. To maximize utility, the monkeys should have
chosen the combination. Because (a) the monkeys in Experiment 1
exhibited a preference for the greater good alone from the onset,
(b) there was no trend over trials in Experiment 1 toward a greater
preference for the single item alone; and (c) the single-trial design
of Experiment 2 precluded a potential repeated-trials effect on
preference in Condition 3, our results provide experimental
evidence that rhesus macaques sometimes prefer less food to more
food.
This finding contrasts with work showing that animals,
including rhesus macaques, have a strong prepotent bias against
selecting the smaller of two quantities of food
[38,39,40,41,42,43,44,45,46,47]. Although contrast effects have
been studied extensively in nonhuman animals [see
32,48,49,50,51], we believe this is the first report of a nonhuman
animal spontaneously choosing the lesser of two food amounts
simply due to the evaluation of the food items, with all items being
positively valued. In other cases that have reported a preference
for less food, social factors appear to override choice preferences.
Some nonhuman primates have turned down offers when another
individual receives a better one [52,53] or when offered something
better than a social partner [53].
In this study, the results appear to reflect an evolutionarily-
conserved process that reflects how choice options are sometimes
evaluated when multiple dimensions (e.g. quantity and quality) vary.
Rather than summing the individual and independent subjective
values of the items in each set, the monkeys appeared to neglect
quantity and assessed the choices based on quality, with the lower-
valued food item reducing the attractiveness of the aggregate option.
Because the monkeys in our study made choices based on a small
number of food items in view, and because their choices reflected a
quality averaging rather than summation leading to a suboptimal
decision, our results suggest that under at least some conditions
rhesus macaque choice behavior reflects the use of an underlying
affective evaluation heuristic: i.e. an affect heuristic. Further work
will need to determine the extent to which this heuristic is applied,
especially since it has been argued that affect and emotion likely play
a primary and ubiquitous role in information processing, helping to
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reduce the processing load in complex environments
[4,5,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18,19,20,21,22,23].
At the same time, affective evaluation processes utilize
perceptual and cognitive mechanisms, the relative contributions
of which have yet to be determined in the context of the less-is-
more effect (Hsee, et al., 1999; Hsee & Zhang, 2004; Hsee &
Zhang, 2010; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Slovic, et al., 2002). In fact,
our finding could reflect an information processing strategy for
complexity reduction that goes beyond affect. For example, it has
been argued that the more general representative heuristic may
subsume all cases in which members of a set, category or group
(e.g. objects, people, events) are represented by an average,
prototype, stereotype, or schema (Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Slovic,
et al., 2002; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). In that regard,
our finding that an average replaced a summation of individual
values provides evidence for the conservation of the representative
heuristic more generally. In any event, further work is required to
determine the pervasiveness of the heuristic, and whether it stems
from one or multiple underlying sources. Certainly, other related
phenomena are likely to be involved, including evaluability, in that
the effect is likely influenced by the ease of evaluation of the
relevant dimensions [4,9,26,27,28,54]. Thus, as discussed in the
introduction, it has been argued that dimensions such as quantity
are more difficult to evaluate (e.g. how good is two of something)
than others such as quality (e.g. how good would a food item taste).
Our results support this claim, given that the monkeys’ choices
reflected a dominance of quality over quantity in their evaluations.
Although the affect heuristic in humans could result from the
need to cope with the complexities of human societies, such as the
rapidly changing aggregations of goods and costs in our complex
trading culture, this study’s findings suggest that it may instead be
an evolved adaptation shared by the two species. Thus, the
heuristic may have evolved in or before the last common ancestor
of catarrhine primates, a group that includes all Old World
monkeys, apes, and humans. Alternatively, this behavior may have
evolved independently due to convergent selection pressures in the
rhesus macaque and human lineages.
Despite the similarity in these biases in monkeys and humans,
there are important differences [55]. Although people clearly
exhibit ‘less-is-more’ irrationality, it thus far has been shown in
four main contexts. First, it occurs when direct contrasts are
precluded and the ‘less’ and ‘more’ alternatives are evaluated in
isolation from each other [1,24,26,27,28]. Second, it occurs when
value is assessed over time, such as when items are received
sequentially [56,57,58,59,60,61,62]. In these cases, duration is
neglected and people exhibit a preference for alternatives that end
well (i.e. a peak-end effect) over ones that simply have the highest
overall aggregate value over time. In the extreme, people actually
prefer a longer duration of pain if it subsides over time (rather than
a shorter duration that remains constant) [56,57,58,59]. Third, it
occurs when ‘less’ and ‘more’ alternatives have different degrees of
predictability, with positive outcomes that were unexpected or
uncertain being more pleasurable than expected ones even of
objectively higher value [e.g. 9,63]. Finally, the fourth context
regards the more general representative heuristic and occurs when
an individual believes that the less likely of two hypothetical options
is actually more likely. For example, Kahneman and Tversky have
famously shown that when people are told that a woman was a
liberal activist in her past, most think it is more likely that the
woman is both a bank teller and an active feminist than a bank
teller, even though the latter includes the former and therefore
must be more probable (i.e. the ‘‘Linda’’ problem) [4,9].
In fact, like humans, chimpanzees also appear to make the
optimal choice (the higher aggregate value) when the options are
presented simultaneously, enabling direct contrasts [33]. In our
study, the monkeys made suboptimal choices with the options
presented simultaneously. Thus, although rhesus macaques and
humans share an affect heuristic, higher-level processes that can
override the heuristic (e.g. executive processes of the prefrontal
cortex) may be superior in humans and hominids more generally
(i.e. great apes and humans) [4,10,27,64,65,66,67,68,69,70]. It will
be important to continue to delineate the similarities, differences,
and evolutionary trajectory of the underlying processes used by
different species. For example, other species may share the
capacity, but require additional experience to reach the same
levels of performance. Indeed, the less-is-more effect dissipated for
Hamlet in Experiment 1. Thus, rhesus macaques have the
capacity to override the heuristic, and with experience, they may
learn to make ‘rational’ choices, in at least some situations. At the
same time, the direct comparison of the choice options in our
experiments might represent an extreme test of the phenomenon
and one that might be easier to overcome.
In summary, we have found that rhesus macaques, like people,
decide between choice items using an affect heuristic, which
sometimes results in suboptimal choices. This heuristic may be
advantageous in complex, uncertain, competitive, and otherwise
time-sensitive environments. If time is of the essence, fast
approximate evaluation processes will outcompete slower, more
deliberative ones. Furthermore, under many foraging conditions,
the heuristic may lead to near optimal decisions. First, when food
is plentiful, using average quality would maximize outcome.
Second, when food is less plentiful, food type — that is, quality —
at a given site (such as a particular fig tree) might be a more
reliable attribute to track than others, such as quantity or duration.
Thus, choices among food patches that contain different types of
resources (e.g. different fruits, vegetables, or nuts) may be strongly
influenced by average quality comparisons. These possibilities are
supported by findings in which foraging primates bypass relatively
abundant lower-quality food items for higher-quality ones that are
farther away or scarcer [e.g. 71,72,73]. Finally, even for a given
food type, the highest-quality items might be especially preferred.
This is supported by findings that have shown, for example, that
relatively prosocial capuchin monkeys foraging in a given tree are
willing to fight for the outside positions that contain the highest-
quality fruits more exposed to sunlight rather than settle for the
larger number of lower-quality fruits toward the tree crown center
[74,75].
Thus, an affect heuristic may provide important selective
advantages. The downside of the adaptation, however, is irrational
decision-making with respect to potentially important attributes
that are neglected, such as quantity. This limitation might reflect
selection pressures that led to information processing systems that
are good enough rather than optimal. At the same time, the affect
heuristic — like other heuristics and biases — is likely the means
by which natural cognitive systems solve challenging problems in
complex, uncertain, and time-sensitive environments
[4,5,6,7,9,11]. Such suboptimal behavior indicates that, for the
brain at least, less can be more.
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